Summary also on: Configure roles and permissions (platform vs business RBAC) and Configure authentication (platform CLI layer).
Understand which catalog roles unlock Builder CLI and online tools on the Miso controller and dataplane — separate from Connected System capability RBAC under business role names.
There is one Role catalog. Map personas below to concrete keys in AI Fabrix roles.
Prerequisites
- Tenant ACTIVE after tenant activation wizard
- Platform admin can assign Controller roles for your environment
- Seeded Role catalog visible (AI Fabrix roles already present after install)
Where it lives
Access is granted on the Miso controller per environment (dev, tst, pro). Dataplane permissions are environment-scoped — the CLI token must carry scopes for the environment you target.
Business capability bindings in Connected System RBAC control integration capabilities — not who can run aifabrix upload. Roles referenced on systems must exist in the catalog or deploy/upload fails closed.
How to set
- Platform admin (
aifabrix-platform-admin) assigns catalog roles in the Controller UI (or your enterprise IAM process) for each environment. - Integration developer (
aifabrix-developer) receives roles that allow: wizard, validate, upload/publish, datasource test, protection upload (as needed). - Governance / AI Trust operators (
aifabrix-ai-trust-operatorand related) receive roles that allow: identity sync,verify-governance, protection validate/upload, AI Trust evaluation. - Everyone (
aifabrix-everyone) — map authenticated users who need LLM call/embed and platform search (consume only). - Developer workstation —
aifabrix login(device flow) or credentials method for CI; verify withaifabrix auth status. - CI/CD — register integration app, store client id/secret in Builder secret store; pipeline uses application token (same pattern as protection upload).
Do not copy full permission tables into integration repos — assign roles in controller; developers run commands with their token.
Defaults and examples
| Persona | Catalog role (typical) | Typical platform work |
|---|---|---|
| Platform admin | aifabrix-platform-admin |
Environments, app registration, role assignment |
| Integration developer | aifabrix-developer |
Wizard, validate, upload, test-integration, test-e2e |
| Governance / AI Trust | aifabrix-ai-trust-operator (+ related) |
Identity sync, protection, verify-governance, AI Trust |
| Read-only auditor | aifabrix-observer |
show --online, download, lifecycle report — no publish |
| Authenticated consumer | aifabrix-everyone |
LLM call/embed + document/record search only |
Exact scope names live in the Builder CLI permissions reference (linked from CLI reference) — use that document when configuring controller roles or debugging 403 errors.
Validate
aifabrix auth status
aifabrix wizard --help # fails fast if token/scopes missing
aifabrix upload <systemKey> --probe
If upload fails with permission errors, fix platform roles — not business RBAC on the external system.
Common mistakes
| Mistake | Fix |
|---|---|
| Confusing business Admin role with platform admin | Separate layers |
| Upload to wrong environment | Match token scopes to target env |
| Pasting client secrets into integration JSON | Use kv:// and secret store |
| Full permission matrix in public docs | Use controller UI + permissions reference |
Example platform token config shape (no secrets — paths vary by OS):
controllerUrl: https://controller.example.com
environment: dev
authenticated: true
Integration JSON still uses root key, displayName, systemKey, entityType, resourceType, primaryKey, and indexed externalId — platform roles gate upload, not field mapping completeness.
Limits
Exact permission scope names change between controller releases — use the Builder CLI permissions reference linked from CLI reference when debugging 403 errors, not copied tables in integration repos.
Business rbac.yaml permissions control capability execution for Role Assistants — they do not replace controller roles required for aifabrix upload, protection upload, or verify-governance. CI pipelines should use application credentials with the same environment scope as the target upload, not a developer device token checked into git.
Governance operators need distinct scopes from integration developers — assigning upload rights without verify-governance produces integrations that publish but fail certification silently until subject-scoped tests run.
Read-only auditors should use show --online and download — not shared integration developer tokens with publish scopes — to avoid accidental upload in shared shells.
Environment-scoped tokens cannot publish to another environment even when auth status reports authenticated — confirm environment in local config before upload --probe failures are escalated as platform outages.
Separate CI service principals per environment when tst and dev share a controller — cross-environment publish is a common source of mistaken verify-governance subjects.